Intermediate Microeconomics	Bundling	on and
	intermediate Microeconomic	S




From the chaos of human behave	
 Monopolistic competition Perfect competition Monopoly 	 Optimization: maximizing profits MR = MC MR = P = MC
 Oligopoly rivalry breeds strategy 	 Strategic behavior game theory: finding dominant strategies and best moves given expectations of rival behavior.
12/18/2001	A. Dye



	w Do Firms Really Compete?
۰.	We have been building elements of an integral theory.
٠	Dimensions of Competition
	1. Technology choice and cost minimization
:	2. Price competition
-	 Pricing strategies – price discrimination
	4. Product differentiation (Quality competition)
	5. To cooperate or not to cooperate?
	6. Entry decisions and entry deterrence
•	Some other dimensions we have touched upon
	1. Interest-group politics (rent-seeking)
1	2. Solving informational problems (information asymmetries)
	3. Efficient organizational decisions







Product B	ununig
services. Wh	r Cable NYC offers many packages of its y packages? Why don't they just offer a d of services, each at a price, and let you s you want?
	ndles MS Word and MS Excel into a wn as MS Office.
Theaters bur packages.	ndle single tickets with seasonal
Other compared of the compa	anies similarly bundle their products. Why his?

					ice	
http://www.twcnyc.co Product bund "capture cons	dling is a nsumer s	surpl	us."		5	
 Suppose mar market segm Mkt segment 					Cable TV	Cable
	nents:				Cable TV \$40	Interne
market segm	nents: 50	are	willing to willing to	pay:		Interne \$20



	-			Cable
Mkt segme	nt		Cable TV	Internet
i	50 are	e willing to pay:	\$40	\$20
ii	50 are	e willing to pay:	\$40	\$0
iii	50 are	e willing to pay:	\$0	\$60
Alterna	er the pricing of tively, calculate	e and compare		
Alterna		e and compare a package offe	er with one	that does no
Alterna	tively, calculate	and compare a package offe	er with one Comparing i	
Alterna	tively, calculate y that includes	e and compare a package offo	er with one Comparing i	that does no revenues with package deal
 Alterna strateg 	tively, calculate y that includes Pricing optior	a and compare a package offe	er with one Comparing r vithout the	that does no revenues with package deal




	: "Sorting out bundling a		
NY Tin See 10	at the Saturday double f nes, 7/26/2001. hth paragraph. Suppose aur Dystopia" and "Kung	feature," by I there are two	Hal Varian, o films,
	al viewers.		
potenti	al viewers. Willingness to pay	"Dinosau	" "Katie"
potenti			-″ ``Katie' 3 \$2



Segment	Willingness to p	ay:	for "Dinosau	" for "Ka	atie"
i	50 are willing to pay		\$3	\$2	
ii	50 are willing to pay		\$2	\$3	
Pricing options: *		Propos	ed price:	Expected	
a) low unb	undled	\$2 f	or ea.		
b) high unl	oundled	\$3 f	or ea.		
c) bundled		\$5 fc	or both		










,	
	roduct differentiation strategies are counterparts and omplements to price discrimination strategies.
	irms may charge different prices to different market segment by isolating those markets,
	or by differentiating the product to better suite each segment,or both.
	roduct differentiation can have positive welfare consequences oo (independent of the effects of competition).
	 by providing a greater variety of goods that better suit varieties o tastes
	 or that better accommodate specialized needs.



	t Differentiation Through ising and Marketing Strategies
advert	 social critics attack marketing analysis and tising as wasteful. Is it wasteful? sumer's viewpoint: Fully informed consumers with complete preference orderings have no need for advertising or market information. Remove complete information: Consumers must spend time, effort and money to discover their best options. The consumer can choose optimal level of information collection: MC(info collection) = marginal increase in satisfaction Does advertising increase or decrease info collection costs? 's viewpoint:
	Firms will not spend money on advertising if they do not think it contributes to profit maximization.
	A necessary condition for an additional unit of market analysis or advertising is:
	 MR(advertising/marketing) > MC(advertising/marketing)
12/18/2001	A. Dye



Product Di Welfare	ifferentiation and Social
The view Why d to d sinc increase Adding di Consui Consui An unc prefere A duing needs	rentiation from Two Perches: from monopolistic competition o firm's differentiate their products? lecrease the elasticity of demand at a given (p, y) e, the Lerner index, $L = \frac{p-MC}{p} = \frac{1}{\eta}$, lowering η ses market power. $p = \frac{1}{p}$, lowering η ses market power. $R = p \left(1 - \frac{1}{\eta}\right)$ mensions mers have information needs. mers have information needs. differentiated product targets the "average need or ence." g heterogeneity, consumers with specific (preferences are often willing to pay more. Why? because alue the product tailored more closely to their needs.
12/18/2001	A. Dye





	t Explore	-1		
	possible ways nternet browse			
Pricing Options	Product or bundle	Operating system (OS)	Browser (Explorer or Navigator)	Consume installation required?
1	MS unbundled	\$100	\$0	yes
2	MS bundled	\$100	\$0	no
3	Netscape	\$100	\$0	yes
4	Netscape bundled w/ an	\$100	\$0	no



